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Objectives: To assess current medical staffing levels within the Hospital Referral System in the 
City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality, South Africa, and analyze the surge capacity needs to 
prepare for the potential of a conventional mass casualty incident during a planned mass gathering. 
Methods: Query of all available medical databases of both state employees and private medical personnel 
within the greater Cape Town area to determine current staffing levels and distribution of personnel across 
public and private domains. Analysis of the adequacy of available staff to manage a mass casualty incident. 
Results: There are 594 advanced pre-hospital personnel in Cape Town (17/100,000 population) and 
142 basic pre-hospital personnel (4.6/100,000). The total number of hospital and clinic-based medical 
practitioners is 3097 (88.6/100,000), consisting of 1914 general physicians; 54.7/100,000 and 1183 specialist 
physicians; 33.8/100,000. Vacancy rates for all medical practitioners range from 23.5% to 25.5%. This 
includes: nursing post vacancies (26%), basic emergency care practitioners (39.3%), advanced emergency 
care personnel (66.8%), pharmacy assistants (42.6%), and pharmacists (33.1%). 
Conclusion: There are sufficient numbers and types of personnel to provide the expected ordinary 
healthcare needs at mass gathering sites in Cape Town; however, qualified staff are likely insufficient 
to manage a concurrent mass casualty event. Considering that adequate correctly skilled and 
trained staff form the backbone of disaster surge capacity, it appears that Cape Town is currently 
under resourced to manage a mass casualty event. With the increasing size and frequency of mass 
gathering events worldwide, adequate disaster surge capacity is an issue of global relevance. 
[West J Emerg Med. 2010; 11(2):189-196.]
INTRODUCTION
Crowds are becoming larger, allowing for a greater impact 
after major and minor events alike. In addition, healthcare 
systems suffer from daily crowding and lack capacity for even 
small increases in volume and types of patients.1,2 
Cape Town is a host city for nine soccer matches as part of 
the FIFA World Cup™ 2010, a sporting event founded in 1930. It 
is second only to the Olympic Games in numbers of participants 
and visitors, including 32 international football teams.3 
Historically Cape Town has hosted large one-time events 
such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the 1996 African Cup of 
Nations and the 2003 Cricket World Cup. In excess of 450,000 
football-specific overseas visitors are expected in South Africa 
for the World Cup, in addition to the regular 300,000 tourists.4 
An excess of 150,000 visitors are projected to be in Cape Town 
alone. The Western Cape region is thus uniquely poised to test 
its disaster preparedness and the special challenges that large, 
culturally diverse, multi-lingual international crowds demand.
Standard medical needs for crowds at mass gatherings 
are well understood and can be met with available resources 
when properly coordinated. Depending on the type, location, 
duration and time of day of the event, as well as weather 
characteristics5, the highest predicted patient presentation 
rates (PPR) are projected to be 2.6 to 3.3 patients/1,000 
participants.1,7,8 Studies indicate that the transport to hospital 
rate (TTHR) ranges from 0.01 to 0.55/1,000 patients.1 
The potential for a planned mass gathering escalating to 
a mass casualty incident (MCI), raises the following question: Volume XI, no. 2  :  May 2010             190  Western Journal of Emergency Medicine
Does Cape Town have adequate resources to meet ordinary 
patient care needs the increased requirements linked to mass 
gatherings expected in June 2010 for the Football World Cup, 
but also for a large casualty-producing incident should it occur?
Study Objectives
Most disaster planning is performed at institutional 
or organizational levels with little collaboration between 
organizations, especially public and private providers. Specific 
objectives of this study are to assess the combined current 
medical staffing levels within the Hospital Referral System 
in the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality, South 
Africa, within both private and state healthcare sectors, as a 
basis for determining whether current resources are adequate 
to manage a conventional mass casualty incident. 
METHODOLOGY
Study Design
Using Pivot tables in Microsoft® Excel, investigators 
queried all available medical databases of state employees 
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and private medical personnel within the greater Cape Town 
area to determine current staffing levels and distribution of 
personnel across public and private domains. The Human 
Resource, Personnel and Salary (PERSAL) system is used by 
the Provincial Government of the Western Cape to register and 
pay employees.9 It allows for data retrieval on salaried state-
employed staff by institution and category, as well as salary 
level. Part-time and seasonal employees were excluded, while 
Department of Health contract and permanent workers were 
included. Qualifications are only recorded for about 10% of all 
employees.
The database was extracted from the PERSAL system 
on October 15, 2008. Analysis revealed 48 categories of 
staff, with similar functions grouped under the same heading. 
Pharmacists of all types were grouped in one category, while 
pharmacy assistants were categorized separately due to need 
for supervision.
Two additional sources were examined to determine 
the ancillary services within the state and medical personnel 
in private services. The Risk Management Division of the 
Provincial Government of the Western Cape was used to 
determine the number of outsourced security personnel available 
in healthcare facilities during both day and night shifts. We used 
the MEDpages database to obtain data on private practitioners, 
combined with locum agencies in Cape Town. This study was 
approved by the local institutional review committee.
RESULTS
Personnel in Cape Town available for first response and 
patient transport during a disaster are 17/100,000 population 
emergency care practitioners and 4.6/100,000 pre-hospital 
providers (Table 1). The overall number of medical personnel 
currently available is 88.6/100,000 population. This number 
excludes interns, as they are regarded as still being in 
training, and aggregates all other medical practitioners 
except psychiatrists. Of the total, general practitioners 
represent 54.7/100,000 population, incorporating all medical 
practitioners who are not registered as specialists in a surgical 
discipline or who are able to provide healthcare during a 
disaster. By definition, this group includes physicians with 
varying expertise, capable of providing non-surgical assistance 
ranging from triage and basic healthcare/first aid to more 
advanced medical stabilization and interventions.
The number of registered specialists is 33.8/100,000 
population. This number includes registrars (senior residents), 
and aggregates all medical and surgical specialists, excluding 
psychiatrists, dermatologists and dentists, as well as those 
specialists “boarding” on non-specialist posts who hold an 
equivalent registration.
Vacancy rates for healthcare providers are available only 
for the public sector. For all medical practitioners, irrespective 
of qualifications, these lie between 23.5% and 25.5%, equaling 
that of all nursing posts at 26% (Table 2).
Table 1. Absolute numbers of private and state healthcare 
practitioners working in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area, 






Ambulance Emergency Assistant 64 161 225
Emergency Care Practitioner 67 437 504
Paramedic 27 63 90
Medical Intern 310 310
Generalists 992 922 1914
Specialists 565 618 1183
Basic Nurse aid (1 year training) 1 3243 3244
Basic Nurses (2 year training)  9 1633 1642
Nursing Sister 922 3990 4912
Radiographer  56 335 391
Pharmacist 507 253 760
Pharmacist Assistant 54 227 281
Physiotherapist 395 114 509
Occupational Therapist 222 127 349
Psychological Support Staff *  775 184 959
Pathologist - Forensic 3 6 9
Messenger n/a 82 82
Porters n/a 307 307
Security Officers (day) n/a 466 466
Security Officers (night) n/a 278 278
*The category “Psychological Support Staff” includes all social 
workers, registered counselors, psychologists and psychiatrists.Western Journal of Emergency Medicine           191  Volume XI, no. 2  :  May 2010
All “specialist” registered nurses who have additional 
qualifications in intensive care, surgery and psychiatry, 
were grouped together. The number in total is 140/100,000 
population for nurses. The relative number of staff and 
enrolled nurses is lower at 54.7/100,000 population and that of 
assistant nurses is 92.8/100,000 population.*1
The psychological support staff category includes social 
workers, registered counselors, psychologists and psychiatrists 
who provide immediate support including reuniting families. 
There are 775 private and 184 state employees (total 959), or 
27.4/100,000 population.
Eighty-one percent of security services are outsourced. 
There are currently no “disaster clauses” in the contracts with 
security services or catering companies. No data are available 
these essential support personnel for private facilities.
Limited numbers of ventilated and non-ventilated (“high 
care”) beds exist in Cape Town (Table 3), which provides 
insight into the staffing needed per level of care.
LIMITATIONS
Data extraction is a challenge in South Africa; there are 
no audits to verify the internal validity and completeness of 
the PERSAL dataset. A complete list of named individuals 
was available only for state institutions. In contrast, it was 
impossible to determine whether private healthcare workers 
were double counted, as the same detail was not available for 
*What is termed “nursing sister” in South Africa refers to the only 
category of nursing staff that has gone to college and obtained a 
four-year degree. All the other categories of nursing staff undergo 
variable amounts of training, ranging from a home-based car-
rer who only receives a three month basic nursing care training 
course, to nursing assistant (one year), to staff and enrolled 
nurses (two years of training but via different routes - one via 
full-time training, one via on-the-job training with off-site teaching 
sessions and minor differences in scope of practice. This means 
that the numbers of “non-sisters” seem high but the competency 
and training levels are quite variable.
this group. Furthermore, many of the data are not available 
in an easily usable format, or underlying competitiveness 
(private sector) or privacy and security concerns (public and 
private sector) limit access to data. 
The data that are available are limited in scope, with only 
certain types of personnel necessary for a comprehensive 
disaster response. For example, staff performing essential 
services, such as cleaning, catering and laundry services, are 
not recorded in a database since these services have been 
largely outsourced.
DISCUSSION
“At the heart of each and every health system, the 
workforce is central in advancing health.”10 The issues facing 
the system in South Africa are common to many parts of the 
world. Healthcare systems are strained on a daily basis and 
disaster planning is relegated below more urgent needs. In 
addition, the misconception that surge capacity can be equated 
with “bed capacity” remains pervasive. In many cases, the 
normal patient volume will still present to clinics and hospitals 
despite a major disaster. A review of the case mix presenting 
to emergency departments (ED) in Cape Town showed that the 
majority of patients self-presented11 and would therefore not 
readily be diverted elsewhere during a disaster. 
Background — Population
The latest census (February 2007), of Cape Town showed 
a population of 3.497 million12, with an annual national 
growth rate of 0.8%.13 Compared to 2001, the Western Cape 
showed a 16.7% increase, vs. a national average of 8.26% 
increase for the same time period.14 Of the population of the 
Western Cape, 66.3% live within the City of Cape Town 
Metropolitan Municipality.15 This results in a disproportionate 
burden on service delivery, including infrastructure, social 
services and in particular healthcare delivery.
Background – The South African Health System
The South African health system is dichotomous, with a 
private healthcare system that is among the best in the world16 
and a state system that is facing infrastructure, personnel and 
supply chain challenges that result in poorer health outcomes. 
More than 80% of the population relies on state medical 
care; private hospitals have capacity for less than 14% of the 
population.17
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Table 2. Percent of posts filled in the public service in the Western 
Cape, South Africa
Filled Total %
Emergency Care Practitioners 1069 1760 60.7%
Paramedics 132 397 33.2%
Medical Generalist 1062 1388 76.5%
Medical Specialist 738 991 74.5%
Nursing 6973 9465 73.7%
Nursing Assistants 3933 4856 81.0%
Pharmacist 329 492 66.9%
Pharmacy Assistants 245 427 57.4%
Physiotherapists 131 167 78.4%
Occupational Therapists 135 189 71.4%
Table 3. Available and staffed intensive care beds
Private State
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During the first ever analysis of the world’s health 
systems in 2000, the WHO ranked South Africa 175th of 190 
member countries.18 According to the latest available annual 
UN Human Development Report, South Africa ranks 121st 
internationally in resources, access and commitment to health 
services.19 This is due to low life expectancies from pulmonary 
tuberculosis, HIV, and a high per-capita expenditure on health 
with lower than expected outcomes. The Years of Life lost in 
the Western Cape for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis combined 
represent 22% of overall mortality, as the first and third 
leading causes respectively.20
This disproportionate spending also drives approximately 
73% of general practitioners and 75% of specialists to work in 
the private sector, while only 41% of the nursing staff do.21 As 
most of these physicians are in solo or small group practice, 
they are generally not connected with disaster planning. 
In addition, these practitioners often work in more than 
one institution or have more than one practice. As is common 
in disaster planning where the same personnel tend to have 
multiple obligations, an institution might overestimate the 
number of medical staff available to it, should a mass casualty 
incident involve more than one healthcare institution or area.22
Surge Capacity
Every health system faces variable demand on its 
resources. In addition to a long-term increase in patient 
volume, there may be short-term increases in demand for 
emergency healthcare services, or “surge.”1 When the 
primary healthcare and outpatient systems are not functioning 
effectively, the EDs become the destination for patients who 
have no other access to primary healthcare.2
A number of actions can be taken to manage a 
catastrophic surge. These include discharging stable ED and 
inpatients, cancelling elective surgeries, opening alternate 
care areas, and calling in standby or off-duty staff. For such a 
system to work effectively, a clear plan must define who has 
authority to initiate such a cascade. In addition, the trigger 
points that activate these costly measures should be specified. 
The activation of a local or regional disaster plan may have 
residual health service delivery implications for days or 
longer. These measures, however, have not been rigorously 
investigated or consistently implemented in all patient 
populations. Hospital beds and staff are already routinely 
saturated to care for the sickest patients. Therefore, there are 
no additional staff to mobilize.
During catastrophic surges, authorities often rely on the 
assistance of the national armed forces, whether as part of the 
search and rescue phases, or by providing logistical support 
or medical care. The UEFA EURO 2008™ football cup 
illustrated the pre-emptive use of the armed forces to provide 
security and medical staff.23 While legislative authority exists, 
this option is not feasible in South Africa, 24 despite having 
two large military medical facilities (2-MIL and IMM), in 
part due to personnel shortages.25,26 South Africa also lacks a 
federally organized civil protection organization that could 
provide the framework for such a response. 
Despite no scientifically-proven norms, a number of 
countries have attempted to define which parameters would 
allow for adequate disaster surge: the U.S. government, 
originally through the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) and subsequently via the Department 
of Homeland Security, has planning scenarios for 500 beds/
million population for patients with symptoms of acute 
infectious diseases, while 50 beds/million is thought to be 
adequate for non-infectious diseases and injuries.27 
The U.S. National Disaster Medical System projections 
range from 100 – 600 patients/million population for 
traumatic disasters. The Israeli military defines adequate surge 
capacity during peacetime for an unspecified threat as being 
able to augment patient care capacity, including staffed beds 
in existing hospitals, by 20%.28 It is unclear whether these 
extrapolations can be applied to the system in South Africa.
Healthcare worker absentee rates can severely disable 
disaster response. One survey predicted absentee rates of 
14% in the case of a mass casualty incident, which increased 
to 40 - 50% in an infectious disease outbreak.29,30 Fear and 
concern for family (almost half of the respondents) and fear 
and concern for self (almost one-third of respondents) were 
the most frequently cited reasons for being unwilling to report 
to work in one large U.S. study,30 factors echoed in a Canadian 
study.31 These are, however, theoretical rates, as these studies 
do not account for actual behavior during a disaster. Pre-event 
education and provision of care sites for families and pets may 
substantially improve response rates.
South Africa already has a pronounced lack of medical 
practitioners 32 (77 physicians per 100,000, as compared to 
256 in the U.S. and 328 in Sweden).33 This has now been 
institutionalized by making the District Health System nurse-
led. However, there is lack of sufficient numbers of trained 
nurses. The more affluent provinces of Gauteng and Western 
Cape are at a slight advantage with the latter having 147 
doctors/100,000. The majority of these (60%) work in the 
private sector. This implies that only 31 doctors/100,000 
permanently work in the public sector in this province (i.e., 
excluding seasonal doctors).34
Only seven state hospitals (limited 24-hour operating 
room capacity) and nine community health centers (no 
operating room capacity) have EDs equipped and staffed to 
manage trauma patients. These centers are usually staffed 
by the most inexperienced personnel (community service 
medical officers) and there is no immediate access to senior 
clinicians.32,34,35 This is due to a flattening of the pyramid 
of expertise, whereby a large number of junior personnel 
function at primary and regional levels and faculty are 
concentrated at academic centers. In addition, many posts are 
vacant, some having been frozen or abolished.
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Calling in off-duty personnel has limited benefit, as the 
entire workforce will be subsequently exhausted in the first 24 
hours. In a non-chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
(CBRN) sudden-onset, defined-scene event, the initial event is 
static, and would usually not result in further casualties after 
24 hours. However, in a dynamic or evolving event, it would 
impact the delivery of “normal” medical care if all available 
staff were used without respite.13
As compared to previously published figures suggesting 
that the Western Cape has the highest level of medical 
personnel resources, with 147 doctors/100,000 34, the findings 
of this study of a combined public/private medical practitioner 
number of 83.7/100,000 seems low. However, the published 
figure from 2004 is based on simple analysis of the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (HPCA) database, 
which includes every paid member on the register who lists a 
residential address in the Western Cape. 
Many doctors working overseas maintain their HPCSA 
registration using addresses of their relatives, while not 
actually working in the province, or even in the country. 
In addition, in 2008, a further 12,000 members, including 
physicians, dentists, occupational therapists, psychologists, 
optometrists, and emergency care practitioners were removed 
from the register36, often because they no longer practice in 
South Africa. Thus, the data collected in this study represent 
a more accurate assessment of the true numbers of staff 
available for immediate disaster surge capacity than the 
previously published HPCSA registration numbers. 
Between 1990 and 2000, 39% of all academic hospital 
professional staff were lost to the private sector and/or 
the health sector of other countries and the posts frozen.37 
Compared to the last officially published figures by the 
Provincial Government of the Western Cape, the total number 
of medical personnel in 2006/2007 is listed as 2108, much 
higher than the current 1850 (which includes 310 medical 
interns). This represents a decrease of 12.2% over one year.38
Another important consideration is that between 14% 
and 50% of primary healthcare workers (exclusive of support 
personnel) may not report for duty during a disaster, as 
determined in two large-scale surveys conducted in 2004 
in the wake of the SARS epidemic.29,30 Also, most call-out 
cascades are not regularly updated. There is only a single 
large-scale multi-agency drill within the city required every 
two years and that focuses on an MCI response at Cape 
Town International Airport, as directed by International Civil 
Aviation Organization regulations.39
Nursing staff, also a critical resource in any healthcare 
system, is in short supply. With 5,623 nurses working within 
the state service, responsible for covering a four-shift system, 
this leaves about 1,406 nurses per shift to support a total of 
1,246 level 1, 1,485 level 2 and 1,460 level 3 beds, including 
128 intensive care unit beds (see below). Nursing staff remain 
the group with the highest shortage, a scenario that is expected 
to worsen over the next decade.40,41 Inter-hospital cooperation 
is hindered in part by fears that scarce nursing resources might 
be “poached.”
Despite a re-examination of the systems underlying 
disaster preparation worldwide following the U.S. World 
Trade Center attacks and hurricanes Katrina and Rita, many 
of the recommendations have not been integrated into 
practice. A snapshot review presented to the U.S. House of 
Representatives in May 2008, referring to an event such as the 
bombings in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004,42 showed that 
none of the seven U.S. cities surveyed had sufficient capacity 
to manage the number of casualties that had sought care at a 
single hospital ED in Madrid in the first few hours following 
the terrorist bombings.43
Disaster modelers have proposed that up to 20% of a 
hospital’s capacity can be augmented in the event of a disaster, 
by actions such as discharging patients awaiting elective 
surgery and low-risk medical and surgical patients in both in- 
and outpatient settings and calling in off-duty staff.44 The U.S. 
congressional review stated that this assumption would not be 
viable in U.S. healthcare facilities43 that already suffer from 
severe crowding on a daily basis.
Similarities and dissimilarities exist in South Africa. 
There is a large indigent population as a result of a “quadruple 
burden of disease,” especially in the form of tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS, leaving many patients with Karnofsky indices of 
less than 50%.45 When this is considered collectively with an 
already overburdened emergency transport system, it leads 
to discharged patients occupying acute in-patient beds while 
awaiting pick-up. These patients often need ongoing basic 
nursing care while awaiting skilled nursing facility or home-
based nursing care.
The Gregorio Marañón University General Hospital in 
Madrid, an 1,800-bed facility, was only able to augment its 
bed capacity by 9% as a response to the influx of casualties 
following the 2004 bombings.42 A team that could initiate 
rapid discharges of stable patients, for example using the 
New York Rapid Discharge Tool, would facilitate a more 
efficient process.46 Such a team, able to coordinate a city-wide 
platform, is lacking in Cape Town. Additionally, real-time bed 
and personnel status data would not be available to itA U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention analysis found 
that severely injured patients treated at hospitals with Level 1 
trauma centers have a 25% lower risk of death than patients 
treated at a lower level or non-trauma center.47 While these 
data were not collected in the setting of a disaster, they may 
suggest that a Level 1 trauma unit would be the preferred 
destination for wounded in the event of a mass casualty 
incident involving trauma. There are only two adult Level 1 
trauma units and one pediatric Level 1 unit in Cape Town.
Fewer data exist for other capacity indicators like 
unoccupied intensive care unit (ICU) beds. Due to nursing 
shortages,48 it is unclear what percentage of the 128 ICU 
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beds in the state are truly functional. To augment capacity, 
nurse:patient ratios may be shifted from 1:1 to 1:2. 
Recommendations
A range of further audits is required to fully assess 
disaster readiness in the Cape Town Metropole. These should 
include:
	 Real-time assessment of facilities, in view of ICU, 
high-care, burn and medical patient care capacity.
	 Audit of available technical expertise in all fields 
(medical and paramedical) in state and private, 
culminating in the establishment of a medical 
reserve database.
	 Individual hospitals require a situational awareness 
regarding the entire system. Rather than relying 
on an ad-hoc system of diversion reports or 
incident warnings, the Disaster Management 
Centre, in conjunction with the Emergency 
Medical Services, needs to seek out and establish 
a link with all registered healthcare institutions to 
determine actual and available staff. This should 
be legislated, implemented and kept current.
	 The City of Cape Town Disaster Risk Management 
Centre needs to develop a system whereby private, 
as well as state, personnel can be mobilized as a 
single healthcare platform when certain criteria 
are met. This could be a graded mobilization, 
depending on the size of the response. Multiple 
public-private partnerships between private 
institutions, outsourced service providers, as 
well as pharmaceutical and medical supplies 
companies, must be in place before the disaster 
	 Pre-event credentialing of state and private 
healthcare providers (e.g., doctors, nurses, 
pharmacists, physiotherapists, social workers, 
psychologists) must be in place and renewed 
and reviewed semi-annually or quarterly. This 
could be easily accomplished if the updating and 
registration of qualifications and skills would form 
part of a continuous medical education system and 
be included both in the databases of the Health 
Professions Council, as well as the public and 
private personnel databases.
	 Long-term medical staff training, recruitment 
and retention strategies need to be revised, so 
that the state system becomes the preferred 
employer. Apart from attracting South African-
trained medical practitioners, nurses and 
pharmacists to return to the country, it should 
also include a streamlined process for registering 
adequately trained foreign qualified practitioners. 
Concurrently, local systems need to be able to train 
more staff; this would involve retaining adequate 
specialist posts at all levels of care to attract junior 
healthcare providers for supervised training, as 
well as allowing for sufficient skilled personnel 
with dedicated time in teaching institutions for 
increased student numbers.
	 Outsourced services such as laundry, security, 
catering and cleaning need to have disaster 
clauses in their Service Level Agreements that 
clearly define them as essential services and 
outline their roles in a declared disaster, including 
responsibilities for costs.
CONCLUSION
Prevention and mitigation are cost-effective for disaster 
management. A hazard-vulnerability-analysis predicts that 
an MCI is a real possibility during a planned mass gathering 
such as the FIFA World Cup™ 2010. Pre-event systems that 
include practitioner identification, credentialing, agreements 
with individual practices, as well as large hospital groups, 
must be actively addressed in conjunction with strategies for 
improving long-term healthcare worker training, recruitment 
and retention.
Staff are sufficient to manage the expected ordinary 
healthcare needs at mass gathering sites in Cape Town, and 
medical resources have been planned based on a modified 
response matrix (South African Medical Resource Model)49 
modeled largely on the medical responses historically required 
at other large sporting events, in the United Kingdom and 
South Africa. However, deliberate planning for staffing to 
meet the needs of a mass casualty event has been lacking. The 
results of this database analysis suggest that Cape Town is 
currently understaffed for a mass casualty incident.
Acknowledgements
This research was performed as a part of the thesis for the 
European Master in Disaster Medicine (EMDM). The author 
is indebted to his Supervisors, Prof Koenig and Prof Bey, who 
are faculty at the EMDM, as well as Drs E and T Visser for 
their assistance in this report. The author of this report, being an 
employee of the Provincial Government of the Western Cape, is 
responsible for its content. No statement in the report should be 
construed as an official position of the Provincial Government 
of the Western Cape.
Address for Correspondence: Tyson B. Welzel, MD, PO Box 
21575, Kloof Street, Cape Town, South Africa. E-mail: twelzel@
earthling.net
Conflicts of Interest: By the WestJEM article submission agreement, 
all authors are required to disclose all affiliations, funding sources 
and financial or management relationships that could be perceived 
as potential sources of bias. 
Welzel et al.  Hospital Staff Surge CapacityWestern Journal of Emergency Medicine           195  Volume XI, no. 2  :  May 2010
REFERENCES
1.  McManus J, Huebner K, Scheulen J. The Science of Surge: Detection 
and Situational Awareness. Acad Emerg Med. 2006; 13:1179–82.
2.  Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States 
Health System. The Evolving Role of Hospital-based Emergency Care, 
in Hospital-Based Emergency Care: At the Breaking Point. National 
Academic Press. 2007:37-57.
3.  Official FIFA™ Website. 2006 FIFA World Cup™ broadcast wider, longer 
and farther than ever before. About FIFA: Organisation — Marketing 
Facts and Figures. Available at: http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/marketing/
news/newsid=111247.html. Accessed August 02, 2008.
4.  Graef, M. 2010 FIFA World Cup state of readiness. Disaster 
Management Indaba, 10 July 2008. Available at: http://www.ndmc.
gov.za/comp/indaba%20pics/2010%20FIFA%20World%20Cup%20
State%20of%20Readiness_Disaster%20Management%20Indaba.ppt. 
Accessed July 15, 2008.
5.  De Lorenzo, RA. Mass-gathering medicine: A review. Prehosp Disaster 
Med. 1997; 12:68-72.
6.  Calabro JJ, Rivera-Rivera EJ, Reich JJ, et al. Provision of emergency 
medical care for crowds. EMS Committee. American College of Emergency 
Physicians. Available at: www.acep.org. Accessed July 02, 2008.
7.  Molloy M, Sherif A, Natin S, et al. Management of Mass Gatherings. In 
Koenig KL, Schultz C, eds. Koenig and Schultz’s Disaster Medicine: 
Comprehensive Principles and Practices. 1st ed. Cambridge University 
Press; 2009.
8.  Arbon P, Bridgewater F, Smith C. Mass-gathering medicine: A predictive 
model for patient presentation rates. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2001; 16:109-16.
9.  National Treasury. Systems - Persal, in: Frequently Asked Questions, 
Department of Treasury of South Africa. Available at: www.treasury.
fs.gov.za/faq.htm. Accessed August 20, 2008.
10.  WHO. The World Health Report 2006: Working together for health, 
World Health Organization: Geneva; 2006. Available at: http://www.who.
int/whr/2006/en/. Accessed April 27, 2008.
11.  Wallis L, Twomey M. Workload and casemix in Cape Town emergency 
departments, South African Medical Journal. 2007; 97:1276–80.
12.  Statistics South Africa. Community survey 2007: municipal data on 
household services. Available at: http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/
Report-03-01-21/Report-03-01-212007.pdf. Accessed July 05, 2008.
13.  Statistics South Africa. Mid-year population estimates 2008, statistical 
release P0302. Available at: http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/
P0302/P03022008.pdf. Accessed October 01, 2008.
14.  Statistics South Africa. Community Survey 2007 (revised version). 
Available at: http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0301/P0301.pdf. 
Accessed July 05, 2008.
15.  Western Cape Provincial Treasury. Migration Trends. In: Western 
Cape Provincial Economic Review & Outlook 2005. 2005:140-145. 
Available at: http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2005/3/pero_ch4.
pdf. Accessed July 05, 2008.
16.  MacFarlane M. Examining the health of healthcare. SAIRR Today. 
The South African Institute of Race Relations, published online on 
August 22, 2008. Available at: http://www.raceleader.org.za/sairr-
today/sairr-today-examining-the-health-of-healthcare-22-august-2008.
html/?searchterm=private%20health%20care. Accessed Oct 19, 2008.
17.  Office of the Registrar of Medical Schemes. Evaluation of medical schemes’ 
cost increases: findings and recommendations, Research Brief. 2008;1. 
Available at: http://www.medicalschemes.com/publications/ZipPublications/
Research%20Briefs/Report_on_Cost_Inc.pdf . Accessed July 10, 2008.
18.  WHO. World Health Report 2000. World Health Organisation. 
Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: http://www.who.int/health-systems-
performance/whr2000.htm. Accessed July 07, 2008.
19.  UNDP. Commitment to health: resources, access and services. 
Human Development Report 2007/ 2008, United Nations Development 
Programme. 2008: 248. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
global/hdr2007-2008/. Accessed July 05, 2008.
20.  PGWC. Leading 10 causes of premature mortality burden. Annual 
Performance Plan 2008/ 2009. Department of Health, Provincial 
Government of the Western Cape. 2008:8. 
21.  Sanders D, Lloyd B. Human resources: international context. In: Barron 
P, Ijumba P, eds. South African Health Review 2005. Health Systems 
Trust; 2005:76–87. 
22.  Krajewski MJ, Sztajnkrycer M, Báez AA Hospital disaster preparedness 
in the United States: new issues, new challenges. The Internet 
Journal of Rescue and Disaster Medicine; 2007: 4. Available at: http://
www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath=journals/ijrdm/vol4n2/
preparedness.xml#e16. Accessed Oct 10, 2008.
23.  Koordinierter Sanitätsdienst. Einsatz der Armee im Rahmen der UEFA 
EURO 2008. Factsheet 10.04.2008. Eidgenössisches Departement 
für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport VBS, Schweizer 
Armee. Available at: http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/vtg/de/home/
themen/einsaetze/laufende/EURO08.parsys.0633.downloadList.41889.
DownloadFile.tmp/factsheetarmeeundeuro08d.pdf. Accessed July 10, 2008.
24.  Masinga S. Army too short-staffed to help. News24.com, media24 
Digital, a NASPERS subsidiary. Feb 14, 2008. Available at: www.
news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics/0,,2-7-12_2271052,00.html. 
Accessed July 05, 2008.
25.  Engelbrecht L. DA questions SANDF’s readiness. July 06, 2009 
by DefenceWeb. Available at: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2763&Itemid=379. 
Accessed July 10, 2009.
26.  DefenceWeb. Fact file: Capabilities of the SA Military Health Service, 
published online on 26 November 2008 by DefenceWeb. Available at: 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=777&Itemid=391. Accessed January 12, 2009.
27.  FEMA. Respond Mission: Medical Surge, in: Target Capabilities List: A 
companion to the National Preparedness Guidelines. US Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007:449–464. Available at: https://www.llis.dhs.gov/
docdetails/details.do?contentID=26724. Accessed July 16, 2008.
28.  Tadmor B, McManus J, Koenig KL. The art and science of surge: experience 
from Israel and the U.S. Military. Acad Emerg Med. 2006; 13:1130-4.
29.  Qureshi K, Gershon RRM, Sherman MF, et al. Healthcare workers’ 
ability and willingness to report to duty during catastrophic disasters. 
J Urban Health. 2005; 82:378–88.
Hospital Staff Surge Capacity  Welzel et al.Volume XI, no. 2  :  May 2010             196  Western Journal of Emergency Medicine
30.  Steffen C, Masterson L, Christos S, et al. Willingness to respond: a survey 
of emergency department personnel and their predicted participation in 
mass casualty terrorist events. Ann Emerg Med. 2004; 44:S34.
31.  Nickell LA, Crighton EJ, Tracy C.S. et al. Psychosocial effects of SARS 
on hospital staff: survey of a large tertiary care institution. Can Med 
Assoc J. 2004: 170:793-8.
32.  Kale, R. South Africa’s health: new South Africa’s doctors: a state of flux, 
Br Med J. 1995; 310:1307-11.
33.  UNDP. Commitment to health: resources, access and services. United 
Nations Development Report 2007/ 2008. United Nations Development 
Programme. 2007:247-249. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org. Accessed 
August 15, 2008. 
34.  Breier M, Wildschut A. The professional labour market and professional 
milieu for medical doctors in South Africa. In: Doctors in a Divided Society. 
Human Sciences Research Council, Cape Town, South Africa. 2008:9-21.
35.  Hubedar H. The nursing profession: production of nurses and proposed 
scope of practice. South African Health Review 2005. Health Systems 
Trust. 2005:88-101.
36.  Barbisch DF, Koenig KL. Understanding surge capacity: essential 
elements. Acad Emerg Med. 2006; 13:1098-102.
37.  Dhliwayo T. Healthcare Practitioners face erasure. HPCSA Newsroom. Health 
Professions Council of South Africa; 2008. Available at: http://www.hpcsa.co.za/
hpcsa/default.aspx?type=News&news=489. Accessed October 12, 2008.
38.  Duncan A. Submission to the South African Human Rights Commission. 
Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Cape Town; 2007. Available at: 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/downloads/CT%20University.ppt . 
Accessed October 30, 2008.
39.  PGWC. Public Health personnel in 2006/ 2007. Annual Performance 
Plan 2008/ 2009. Department of Health, Provincial Government of the 
Western Cape; 2008:49.
40.  ICAO. Aerodrome Operations. In: Safety Management Manual. 1st ed. 
Doc 9859. International Civil Aviation Authority; 2006:18-1-18-13.
41.  Aiken LH, Buchan J, Sochalski J, et al. Trends in international nurse 
migration. Health Affairs. 2004; 23:69–77.
42.  Kuehn BM. No end in sight to nursing shortage: bottleneck at nursing 
schools a key factor. JAMA. 2007; 298:1623–5.
43.  Gutierrez de Ceballos JP, Turégano Fuentes F, Perez Diaz D, et al. 
Casualties treated at the closest hospital in the Madrid, March 11, 
terrorist bombings. Crit Care Med. 2005; 33:S107-12.
44.  US House of Representatives. Hospital emergency surge capacity: 
not ready for the “predictable surprise.” Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, Majority Staff; 2008. Available at: http://oversight.
house.gov/documents/20080505101837.pdf . Accessed July 05, 2008.
45.  Casani JAP, Romanosky AJ. Surge capacity. In: Ciottone GC, ed. 
Disaster Medicine. 3rd ed. Mosby Elsevier Publishing. 2006:193-202.
46.  Ntuli A, Day C. Ten years on – Have we got what we ordered? South 
African Health Review 2003-2004. Health Systems Trust. 2005:1-10.
47.  Continuum Health Partners. Rapid patient discharge tool. The New York City 
Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, NYC Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene; 2007. Available at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/
pdf/bhpp/hepp-hosps-rpdt-rev042308.pdf. Accessed October 02, 2008.
48.  MacKenzie EJ, Rivara, FP, Jurkovich, GJ, et al. A national evaluation of the 
effect of trauma-center care on mortality. N Engl J Med. 2006; 354:366–78.
49.  PGWC. Comprehensive service plan for the implementation of 
healthcare 2010. Provincial Government of the Western Cape. Available 
at: http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2005/7/healthcare_2010_full.
doc.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2008.
50.  Smith W. The South African Medical Resource Model (unpublished) 
— presented at the Emergency Medicine in the Developing World 
Congress in Cape Town, 24 November 2009.
Welzel et al.  Hospital Staff Surge Capacity
Box 1
Surge Definitions
Surge Capacity1 Staff  (trained personnel), 
Stuff  (equipment and supplies), 
Structure  (existing physical healthcare facilities or alternate care sites for patients coupled with inci-
dent management structure or organizational arrangement)
Systems* (organizational arrangement to coordinate incident management components, and to guide 
with appropriate policies and procedures)
*The 3S Surge System Model consists of “Staff, Stuff, & Structure”
Patient Care Capacity2 full spectrum of staff, stuff and structure, the components of surge capacity described 
above
Daily Surge3 Term that has been challenged, but sometimes used to describe fluctuations in patient care 
demands in a non-disaster situation; can be modeled and is generally predictable
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